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Abstract 
We propose a concept to study the stability of social and economic networks when players are 
farsighted and allocations are determined endogenously. A set of networks is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining 
threat such that (i) there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another 
network inside the set, (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to 
some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is allocated among players so that players 
suffer or benefit equally from being linked to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain 
at their respective credible bargaining threat. We show that the set of strongly efficient networks is the 
unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is 
anonymous and component efficient and the value function is top convex. Moreover, the 
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously. 
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1 Introduction
The organization of agents into networks and groups plays an important role in the
determination of the outcome of many social and economic interactions.1 A simple
way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is
to examine the requirement that players do not benet from altering the structure
of the network. An example of such a condition is the pairwise stability notion
dened by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). A network is pairwise stable if no player
benets from severing one of her links and no two players benet from adding a link
between them. Pairwise stability is a myopic denition. Players are not farsighted
in the sense that they do not forecast how others might react to their actions. For
instance, the adding or severing of one link might lead to subsequent addition or
severing of another link. If players have very good information about how others
might react to changes in the network, then these are things one wants to allow for
in the denition of the stability concept. For instance, a network could be stable
because players might not add a link that appears valuable to them given the current
network, as that might in turn lead to the formation of other links and ultimately
lower the payo¤s of the original players.
Allocation rules keep track of how value is allocated among the players in the
network. The allocation rule may simply be the utility that players directly get,
accounting for the costs and benets of being linked to other players in the network.
But there are many situations where the allocation rule is the result of some bar-
gaining among linking players. However, most network formation models are such
that both the network formation process and the allocation of value among players
in a network are separated and the players are not farsighted.
In this paper we address the question of which networks one might expect to
emerge in the long run when the players are farsighted and the allocation of value
among players is determined simultaneously with the network formation as players
may bargain over their shares of value within their component. Hence, we introduce
the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining.
A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that (i)
there is no farsighted improving path from one network inside the set to another
1See Jackson (2003, 2008), or Goyal (2007) for a comprehensive introduction to the theory of
social and economic networks.
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network inside the set,2 (ii) from any network outside the set there is a farsighted
improving path to some network inside the set, (iii) the value of each network is
allocated among players so that players su¤er or benet equally from being linked
to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective
credible bargaining threat. In contrast to Chwes (1994) denition of von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsighted stability,3 allocations are going to be agreed upon among
farsighted players when allocations and links are determined jointly. To capture this
idea we request that the allocation rule satisfy the property of equal bargaining power
for farsighted players. This property requires that, for each pair of players linked in
the network, both players su¤er or benet equally from being linked with respect
to their respective bargaining threat. In addition, we request the bargaining threat
to be credible. Credibility means that the threat can be reached by a farsighted
improving path emanating from some network adjacent to the network over which
bargaining takes place.
We show that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anony-
mous and component e¢ cient and the value function is anonymous, component
additive and top convex. Moreover, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule
emerges endogenously.
We next incorporate the property of equal bargaining power for farsighted play-
ers into the original denition of a pairwise farsightedly stable set due to Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009).4 We nd that if a set of networks is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining, then it is a pairwise
farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Hence, if the allocation rule is anonymous
and component e¢ cient and the value function is anonymous, component additive
and top convex, then the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is a pairwise farsight-
edly stable set with bargaining where the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule
emerges endogenously. However, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks E(v) can also
2A farsighted improving path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or
sever links based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network. Each
network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one.
3Mauleon, Vannetelbosch and Vergote (2011) have provided the characterization of von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in one-to-one matching problems and in many-
to-one matching problems with substitutable preferences.
4Other approaches to farsightedness in network formation are Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetel-
bosch (2004), Page, Wooders and Kamat (2005), Dutta, Ghosal, and Ray (2005), and Page and
Wooders (2009).
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be a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining even for anonymous allocation
rules where the value of each component is not shared equally among the members of
the component. If the value function is not top convex, then ine¢ cient networks can
be farsightedly stable with bargaining. We provide an example where, contrary to
pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted
stability with bargaining only leads to the emergence of ine¢ cient networks.
There are a number of papers that look at the endogenous determination of
allocations together with network formation. Currarini and Morelli (2000) have
introduced a sequential network formation game, where players propose links and
demand allocations. Given an exogenously given order, each player proposes in turn
the links she wants to form and she demands an allocation. Once all proposals
have been made, links are formed if both players involved in the link have proposed
the link and the demands of the players are compatible (i.e. demands do not ex-
ceed the value produced). They have shown that, if the value function satises size
monotonicity (i.e. if the e¢ cient networks connect all players), then their sequential
network formation process with endogenous allocations leads all subgame perfect
equilibrium to be e¢ cient.5 Mutuswami and Winter (2002) have proposed subscrip-
tion mechanisms for network formation when the costs from linking are publicly
known but the benets from linking are not known to the social planner. Their
mechanism is similar to Currarini and Morelli (2000) sequential network formation
game6 and leads to the formation of an e¢ cient network.7 The payo¤s in Currarini
and Morelli (2000) and Mutuswami and Winter (2002) are endogenously generated
but are highly asymmetric and sensitive to the order in which players make pro-
posals. More recently, Bloch and Jackson (2007) have studied the role played by
transfers payments in the formation of networks. They have investigated whether
di¤erent forms of transfers (direct transfers, indirect transfers or contingent trans-
fers) can solve the conict between stability and e¢ ciency when there are network
externalities that usually lead to the emergence of ine¢ cient networks when trans-
5However, if the network formation process is simultaneous, then there are value functions that
satisfy size monotonicity for which ine¢ cient equilibria can arise.
6Each player, when it is her turn, proposes the set of links she wants to form and her cost
contribution. Once all proposals have been made, the social planner selects the network to be
formed and the cost contributions of the players.
7Slikker and van den Nouweland (2000) have studied the formation of communication networks
with endogenous payo¤ division but with a strategic form game. Similarly, Matsubayashi and
Yamakawa (2004) have proposed a strategic form game to share the cost of building the network
in a model where the benets of the network decays as the distance among players increases.
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fers are not feasible.8 But all these papers have assumed either simultaneous move
games (with myopic players) or sequential move games (with nite horizon and spe-
cic ordering). We go further by looking at the endogenous determination of payo¤s
together with network formation in presence of farsighted players.
The paper most closely related to our work is Navarro (2013a) who has studied
a dynamic process of network formation that is represented by means of a station-
ary transition probability matrix. Forward-looking players have a common discount
factor and receive payo¤s at each moment in time according to a stationary allo-
cation rule. Three properties are imposed on the allocation rule and the transition
probability. First, the allocation rule together with the transition probability are
expected fair. That is, for each link in the network both players involved in the link
benet or su¤er the same stream of discounted expected payo¤s from cutting their
link at time zero. Second, the allocation rule is component e¢ cient. That is, the
value of each component is shared among the members of the component. Third,
the expected fair allocation rule and transition probability is a pairwise network
formation procedure. That is, the probability that a link is added (or deleted) is
positive only if the stream of discounted expected payo¤s for the players involved
in adding (or deleting) the link is positive. Navarro (2013a) has shown that if the
common discount factor is small enough (i.e. players are close to be myopic), then
there exists an allocation rule together with a transition probability matrix such
that the allocation rule is component e¢ cient and the allocation rule together with
the transition probability is an expected fair pairwise network formation procedure.9
Here, we rather adopt the stability approach because the noncooperative or
dynamic approach is much sensitive to the specication of the bargaining game
and network formation process, whose ne details (such as how the game ends) can
be very important in determining what networks form and how value is allocated.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations,
basic properties and denitions for networks. In Section 3 we dene the notion
of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining and we look at
the relationship between von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bar-
8They have found that indirect transfers together with contingent transfers are needed to guar-
antee that e¢ cient networks form. Indirect transfers enable players to take care of positive exter-
nalities by subsidizing the formation of links by other players; while contingent transfers enable
players to overcome negative externalities by preventing the formation of links
9Navarro (2013b) has used her dynamic network formation process and her solution concept to
investigate the tension between e¢ ciency and stability.
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gaining and e¢ ciency of networks. In Section 4 we propose the notion of pairwise
farsighted stability with bargaining and we look at its relationship with the von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining. In Section 5 we discuss
some properties. In particular, we address situations where there are externalities
across components and we provide a condition such that the set of e¢ cient net-
works remains the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining. In Section 6 we conclude.
2 Networks, values and allocation rules
Networks
LetN = f1; : : : ; ng be the nite set of players who are connected in some network
relationship. The network relationships are reciprocal and the network is thus mod-
eled as a non-directed graph. Players are the nodes in the graph and links indicate
bilateral relationships between players. Thus, a network g is simply a list of which
pairs of individuals are linked to each other. We write ij 2 g to indicate that i and
j are linked under the network g. Let gS be the set of all subsets of S  N of size
2.10 So, gN is the complete network. The set of all possible networks or graphs on N
is denoted by G and consists of all subsets of gN : The network obtained by adding
link ij to an existing network g is denoted g + ij and the network that results from
deleting link ij from an existing network g is denoted g   ij. Let gjS = fij j ij 2 g
and i 2 S, j 2 Sg. Thus, gjS is the network found deleting all links except those that
are between players in S. For any network g, let N(g) = fi j 9 j such that ij 2 gg
be the set of players who have at least one link in the network g. The neighborhood
of player i is the set of players that i is linked to: Ni(g) = fj j ij 2 gg. A network
g0 is adjacent to g if g0 = g + ij or g0 = g   ij for some ij. Let A(g) be the set of
adjacent networks to g. Let Ai(g) = fg0 2 A(g) j #Ni(g0) 6= #Ni(g)g.
A path in a network g 2 G between i and j is a sequence of players i1; : : : ; iK
such that ikik+1 2 g for each k 2 f1; : : : ; K   1g with i1 = i and iK = j, and such
that each player in the sequence i1; : : : ; iK is distinct. A non-empty network h  g
is a component of g, if for all i 2 N(h) and j 2 N(h) n fig; there exists a path in
h connecting i and j, and for any i 2 N(h) and j 2 N(g), ij 2 g implies ij 2 h.
The set of components of g is denoted by C(g). Let (g) denote the partition of
10Throughout the paper we use the notation  for weak inclusion and  for strict inclusion.
Finally, # will refer to the notion of cardinality.
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N induced by the network g. That is, S 2 (g) if and only if either there exists
h 2 C(g) such that S = N(h) or there exists i =2 N(g) such that S = fig.
Value functions
A value function is a function v that assigns a value v(S; g) to every network
g and every coalition S 2 (g). This value v(S; g) can be perfectly distributed
among the players in S. Given v, the total value that can be distributed at network
g is equal to v(g) =
P
S2(g) v(S; g). The set of all possible value functions v is
denoted by V. A value function v is component additive (or has no externalities
across components) (Jackson and Wolinksky, 1996) if for any g 2 G and S 2 (g),
v(S; g) = v(S; gjS). Component additivity means that the value of a component of
the network does not depend on the structure of the network outside the component.
Given a permutation of players  and any g 2 G, let g = f(i)(j) j ij 2 gg. Thus,
g is a network that is identical to g up to a permutation of the players. A value
function v is anonymous (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) if for any permutation ,
g 2 G and S 2 (g), v(f(i) j i 2 Sg; g) = v(S; g). A network g 2 G is strongly
e¢ cient relative to v if v(g)  v(g0) for any g0 2 G. Let E(v) be the set of
strongly e¢ cient networks. A value function v is top convex (Jackson and van den
Nouweland, 2005) if some strongly e¢ cient network maximizes the per capita value
among players. Let (v; S) = maxggS v(g)=#S. The value function v is top convex
if (v;N)  (v; S) for any S  N .
Allocation rules
An allocation rule y is a function that assigns a payo¤ yi(g; v) to player i 2 N
from graph g under the value function v 2 V. An allocation rule y is component
e¢ cient (Myerson, 1977) if for any g 2 G and S 2 (g), Pi2S yi(g; v) = v(S; g).11
Given a permutation , let v be dened by v(S; g) = v(f 1(i) j i 2 Sg; g 1) for
any g 2 G. An allocation rule y is anonymous (Jackson and Wolinsky, 19996) if for
any v, g 2 G and permutation , y(i)(g; v) = yi(g; v).
Some prominent allocation rules have been proposed. The egalitarian alloca-
tion rule (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) ye is dened by yei (g; v) = v(g)=n. For a
component additive v and network g, the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) yce is such that for any S 2 (g) and each i 2 S,
ycei (g; v) = v(S; gjS)=#S. For a v that is not component additive, yce(g; v) = v(g)=n
for all g; thus, yce splits the value v(g) equally among all players if v is not component
11An allocation rule y is component balanced (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) if for any component
additive v, g 2 G and S 2 (g), Pi2S yi(g; v) = v(S; gjS).
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additive.
Another allocation rule is the Myerson value:
yMVi (g; v) =
X
SNnfig
v(gjS[fig)  v(gjS))

#S!(n #S   1)!
n!

.
An allocation rule satises equal bargaining power if for any component additive v
and g 2 G we have yi(g; v)  yi(g  ij; v) = yj(g; v)  yj(g  ij; v). Equal bargaining
power requires that both players equally benet or su¤er from the addition of the
link. It does not impose that players split the marginal value of a link. Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) have shown that y satises component balance and equal bargaining
power if and only if y(g; v) = yMV (g; v) for all g 2 G and component additive v.12
However, Jackson (2005) has argued that the basic problem with the Myerson value
allocation rule is that the value of other possible networks is not properly accounted
for in its calculations. For instance, if alternative network structures are taken
into account when bargaining over how to allocate value, then values of alternative
networks, and not just (adjacent) subnetworks, should be important in determining
the allocation. Hence, Jackson (2005) has proposed the player-based exible network
allocation rule:13
yPBFNi (g; v) =
v(g)bv(gN) X
SNnfig
 bv(gS[fig)  bv(gS)#S!(n #S   1)!
n!

,
where bv is the monotonic cover of v dened by bv = maxg0g v(g0).14 However,
the player-based exible network allocation rule rule violates both equal bargaining
power and component balance.15 We now provide an example that illustrates the
drawbacks of the Myerson value and the player-based exible network allocation
rule. This example also motivates the necessity of determining the allocation rule
together with the formation of the network in the long run.
Example 1 The Myerson value. Take N = f1; 2; 3g and the value function dened
by v(f1; 2; 3g; f12; 13; 23g) = 0, v(f1; 2; 3g; f12; 13g) = 5, v(f1; 2; 3g; f12; 23g) =
12Navarro (2007) has proposed a component e¢ cient and fair allocation rule when the value of
the network can exhibit any type of externalities across its components.
13Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2005) have proposed a sequential mechanism whose subgame
perfect equilibria rise to strongly e¢ cient networks and to payo¤s that coincide with Jacksons
player-based exible network allocation rule.
14The monotonic cover of a value function gives the highest value that can be generated by
building a network out of a given set of links.
15Navarro (2010) has proposed three modications of Jacksons (2005) exible network axiom
when the structure of externalities across components is known.
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v(f1; 2; 3g; f13; 23g) = 0, v(f1; 2g; f12g) = v(f3g; f12g) = 0, v(f1; 3g; f13g) =
v(f2g; f13g) = 0, v(f2; 3g; f23g) = 4, v(f1g; f23g) = 0, and v(S; ;) = 0. We have
depicted in Figure 1 the di¤erent network congurations with their associated allo-
cations. For networks that generate value, the Myerson value leads to equal sharing
of the value in f12; 13g, yMVi (f12; 13g) = 5=3 for i 2 N . Hence, players 2 and 3
obtain less than what they could get in f23g, namely yMV2 (f23g) = 2 = yMV3 (f23g).
Players 2 and 3 have a viable outside option but the Myerson value does not take this
option into account because f23g is not a subnetwork of f12; 13g. The player-based
exible network allocation rule provides a more reasonable allocation than the My-
erson value for f12; 13g by giving higher allocations to players 2 and 3 than player 1:
yMV2 (f12; 13g) = 7=3 = yMV3 (f12; 13g) and yMV1 (f12; 13g) = 1=3. However, it gives
yPBFN2 (f23g) = 28=15 = yPBFN3 (f23g) and yPBFN1 (f23g) = 4=15 violating compo-
nent balance. Hence, this allocation is unlikely to emerge at f23g since the value
function is component additive and players 2 and 3 transfer some payo¤ to player 1
who does not belong to their component. 
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Figure 1: The Myerson value (The player-based exible network allocation rule).
Allocation rules with farsighted players
The equal bargaining power property imposes that, for each link ij in a network
g, both players i and j should equally benet or su¤er when bargaining over how to
allocate value taking as reference network the adjacent subnetwork g   ij. Hence,
equal bargaining power presumes that players are myopic, not farsighted, in the
sense that they do not forecast how others might react if they break the link ij.
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For instance, the severing of ij might lead to subsequent severing or addition of
another link. Once players are farsighted, equal bargaining power will impose that
players equally benet or su¤er when bargaining over how to allocate value taking
as reference network or bargaining threat, not necessarily adjacent subnetworks, but
networks that may be reached from adjacent networks through a sequence of net-
works when players form or delete links based on the improvement the end network
o¤ers relative to the current one.
3 Von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability
with bargaining
We now propose the notion of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with
bargaining, to predict which networks are likely to emerge and which allocations are
going to be agreed upon among farsighted players when allocations and links are
determined jointly.
We rst introduce the notion of farsighted improving path from Herings, Mauleon
and Vannetelbosch (2009) and the notion of bargaining threat. A farsighted improv-
ing path is a sequence of networks that can emerge when players form or sever links
based on the improvement the end network o¤ers relative to the current network.
Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link
is added, then the two players involved must both prefer the end network to the
current network, with at least one of the two strictly preferring the end network. If
a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two players involved in the
link strictly prefers the end network. Formally, a farsighted improving path from a
network g to a network g0 6= g is a nite sequence of graphs g1; : : : ; gK with g1 = g
and gK = g0 such that for any k 2 f1; : : : ; K 1g either: (i) gk+1 = gk ij for some ij
such that yi(gK ; v) > yi(gk; v) or yj(gK ; v) > yj(gk; v), or (ii) gk+1 = gk + ij for some
ij such that yi(gK ; v) > yi(gk; v) and yj(gK ; v)  yj(gk; v). For a given network g,
let F (g) be the set of networks that can be reached by a farsighted improving path
from g. Notice that F (g) may contain many networks and that a network g0 2 F (g)
might be the endpoint of several farsighted improving paths starting in g.
A bargaining threat z is a function that assigns to each network g 2 G a network
zi(g) 2 G for each player i 2 N . Intuitively, when player i is negotiating how to
share the surplus with other players she is linked to in g, she has in mind the payo¤
she might obtain at some other network, zi(g), not necessarily adjacent to g since
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players are farsighted.
A set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining if there exists an allocation rule and a bargaining threat such that the
following conditions hold. First, there is no farsighted improving path from one
network inside the set to another network inside the set (internal stability). Second,
from any network outside the set there is a farsighted improving path to some
network inside the set (external stability). Third, the value of each network is
allocated among players so that players su¤er or benet equally from being linked
to each other compared to the allocation they would obtain at their respective
bargaining threat (equal bargaining power). Fourth, the bargaining threat at each
network is credible. Credibility means that the threat can be reached by a farsighted
improving path emanating from some network adjacent to the network over which
bargaining takes place. Formally, von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
sets with bargaining are dened as follows.
Denition 1. A set of networks G  G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
stable set with bargaining if there exists an allocation rule y and a bargaining threat
z such that
(i) 8g 2 G; F (g) \G = ;; (Internal Stability)
(ii) 8g0 2 G nG; F (g0) \G 6= ;; (External Stability)
(iii) 8g 2 G and ij 2 g,
(a) yi(g; v)  yi(zi(g); v) = yj(g; v)  yj(zj(g); v), (Equal Bargaining Power)
(b) zi(g) 2 (F (g00)[ fg00g)\G 6= ; for some g00 2 Ai(g) and zj(g) 2 (F (g000)[
fg000g) \G 6= ; for some g000 2 Aj(g). (Consistency)
Condition (i) in Denition 1 is the internal stability condition. From any network
within G, there is no farsighted improving path leading to some other network in
G. Condition (ii) in Denition 1 requires external stability and implies that the
networks within the set are robust to perturbations. From any network outside G,
there is a farsighted improving path leading to some network in G.16 Condition (ii)
implies that if a set of networks is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
16There are some random dynamic models of network formation that are based on myopic
incentives to form links such as Jackson and Watts (2002) and Tercieux and Vannetelbosch (2006).
These models aim to use the random process to select from the set of pairwise stable networks.
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set with bargaining, it is non-empty. Part (a) of condition (iii) in Denition 1 is the
equal bargaining power property for farsighted players. It requires that for each pair
of players linked in g both players su¤er or benet equally from being linked with
respect to their respective bargaining threat. Part (b) of condition (iii) in Denition
1 imposes a consistency requirement on the bargaining threat. When bargaining
how to share the value at g, the bargaining threat zi(g) for each player i has to
be such that the threat can be reached by a farsighted improving path emanating
from some adjacent network to g when the adjacent network is not in G. That is,
zi(g) 2 F (g00) for some g00 2 Ai(g) when g00 =2 G. Moreover, zi(g) belongs to G,
which makes zi(g) a credible threat.17
Example 1 (continued). We observe that E(v) = ff12; 13gg is not a von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the Myerson value alloca-
tion rule since external stability is violated. There is no farsighted improving path
from the network f23g to the network f12; 13g if y is the Myerson value; players 2
and 3 obtain a higher payo¤ in f23g than in f12; 13g. Notice that the set ff23gg
is not a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is
the Myerson value because it violates equal bargaining power for farsighted players
at networks where some players are linked to each other and v = 0. For instance,
players 1 and 2 obtain both 0 at f12g but obtain, respectively, 0 and 2 at their
consistent bargaining threat (zi(f12g) = f23g).
If y is the player-based exible network allocation rule, then E(v) = ff12; 13gg
is a not a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining even
though internal stability, external stability and consistency in Denition 1 are sat-
ised. But, equal bargaining power for farsighted players is violated at networks
where some players are linked to each other and v = 0. In general, equal bar-
gaining power for farsighted players may be violated at any network. For instance,
take v0 such v0(g) = v(g) for all g except for f12g where v0(f12g; f12g) = 2 and
v0(f3g; f12g) = 0. The player-based exible networks allocations for the di¤erent
network congurations are given in Figure 2. We observe that E(v) = ff12; 13gg
satises internal stability, external stability and consistency, but equal bargaining
power is now violated at all networks g 6= f12; 13g included networks f12g and f23g.
However, E(v) = ff12; 13gg is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
set with bargaining if y is the allocation rule given in Table 1 with 1=2 > " > 0.
17Notice that we do not impose that each player chooses her best alternative among her credible
threats.
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f13; 23g; f12; 23g
; f12g f13g f23g f12; 13g f12; 13; 23g
y1 0  (1 + 3")=2  (1 + 3")=2 0 1  2"  (2 + 6")=3
y2 0 (1 + 3")=2 0 2 2 + " (1 + 3")=3
y3 0 0 (1 + 3")=2 2 2 + " (1 + 3")=3
Table 1: A farsighted allocation rule for value function v
It can be easily veried that internal stability and external stability are satised
for 1=2 > " > 0, and that this allocation rule satises equal bargaining power for
farsighted players and consistency at all networks. This allocation rule also satises
component balance, a property that is not required by the concept of von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining. Component balance makes sense
when the value function is component additive, and the value function of our example
satises component additivity. Notice that the allocation rule given in Table 1 is not
the unique one that may arise with E(v) = ff12; 13gg when players are farsighted.
f13; 23g; f12; 23g
; f12g f13g f23g f12; 13g f12; 13; 23g
y1 0  (1 + 4")=2  (1 + 5")=2 0 1  2"  (2 + 9")=3
y2 0 (1 + 4")=2 0 (4  ")=2 2 + " (1 + 3")=3
y3 0 0 (1 + 5")=2 (4 + ")=2 2 + 2" (1 + 6")=3
Table 2: Another farsighted allocation rule for value function v
For instance, the set E(v) = ff12; 13gg is also a von Neumann-Morgenstern far-
sightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the allocation rule given in Table 2 with
1=3 > " > 0. This allocation rule leads to a division of the value of the e¢ cient
network f12; 23g where player 3 obtains a larger share than player 2 even though
players 2 and 3 are symmetric in f12; 23g. 
Proposition 1. Take any bargaining threat z. If y satises component e¢ ciency
and equal bargaining power for farsighted players then y is such that
yi(g; v) = yi(zi(g); v) +
1
#S
"
v(S; g) 
X
j2S
yj(zj(g); v)
#
8 i 2 S, S 2 (g).
Proof. See the appendix.
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Figure 2: The player-based exible network allocation rule.
Proposition 1 tells us that, if the allocation rule satises component e¢ ciency
and equal bargaining power for farsighted players then this allocation rule will lead
to a division of the value of the component where each player gets the payo¤ at her
bargaining threat plus an equal share of the excess between the value and the sum
of the threats.
We now turn to the existence of a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
set with bargaining. Is the set of strongly e¢ cient networks E(v) always a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining?
Proposition 2. The set of strongly e¢ cient networks E(v) is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the egalitarian allocation
rule.
Proof. [Internal stability] We have that yi(g; v) = yj(g; v) = yi(g0; v) = yj(g0; v) for
all i; j 2 N , for all g; g0 2 E(v) since y is the egalitarian allocation rule. Hence,
there is no farsighted improving path from any g 2 E(v) to another g0 2 E(v), and
E(v) satises internal stability. [External stability] In addition, yi(g; v) > yi(g0; v)
for all i 2 N , for all g 2 E(v) and g0 =2 E(v) since y is the egalitarian allocation
rule and g is e¢ cient. Hence, there is a farsighted improving from any g0 =2 E(v)
to some g 2 E(v), and E(v) satises external stability. [Equal bargaining power]
Since yi(g; v) = yj(g; v) = yi(g0; v) = yj(g0; v) for all i; j 2 N , for all g; g0 2 E(v),
and yi(g00; v) = yj(g00; v) for all i; j 2 N , for all g00 =2 E(v), we have that equal
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bargaining power for farsighted players is satised for any z such that zi(g) 2 E(v)
for g 2 G. [Consistency] Since there is a farsighted improving from any g0 =2 E(v)
to some g 2 E(v), there exists some z such that for all g 2 G and ij 2 g we
have that zi(g) 2 (F (g00) [ fg00g) \ E(v) 6= ; for some g00 2 Ai(g) and zj(g) 2
(F (g000) [ fg000g) \ E(v) 6= ; for some g000 2 Aj(g).
Proposition 2 shows that the egalitarian allocation rule guarantees the existence
of a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. However,
this allocation rule violates component e¢ ciency and each players allocation is
independent of her position in the network.
Lemma 1. Consider any anonymous, component additive and top convex value
function v. The set of strongly e¢ cient networks E(v) is the unique von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the componentwise egali-
tarian allocation rule.
Proof. Take any anonymous and component additive value function v. Top convex-
ity implies that all components of a strongly e¢ cient network must lead to the same
per-capita value (if some component led to a lower per capita value than the average,
then another component would have to lead to a higher per capita value than the av-
erage which would contradict top convexity). Top convexity also implies that, under
the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, any g 2 E(v) Pareto dominates all
g0 =2 E(v). Then, it is immediate that F (g) = ; for all g 2 E(v) [Internal stability]
and that F (g0) \ E(v) 6= ; for all g0 2 G n E(v) [External stability]. Since v is top
convex, all components of any network g 2 E(v) lead to the same per-capita value.
Since y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, equal bargaining power for
farsighted players is satised for any z such that zi(g) 2 E(v) for g 2 G [Equal
bargaining power]. Since F (g0)\E(v) 6= ; for all g0 2 G nE(v), there exists some z
such that for all g 2 G and ij 2 g we have that zi(g) 2 (F (g00)[fg00g)\E(v) 6= ; for
some g00 2 Ai(g) and zj(g) 2 (F (g000) [ fg000g) \E(v) 6= ; for some g000 2 Aj(g) [Con-
sistency]. Thus, E(v) satises internal stability, external stability, equal bargaining
power and consistency. It is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly sta-
ble set with bargaining if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule because
F (g) = ; for all g 2 E(v) (hence, external stability would be violated if not all
g 2 E(v) belong to G) and F (g0) \ E(v) 6= ; for all g0 2 G n E(v) (hence, internal
stability would be violated if some g0 =2 E(v) belong to G).
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Figure 3: Top convexity and farsighted stability with bargaining.
Proposition 3. Consider any anonymous, component additive and top convex value
function v. If y is component e¢ cient and anonymous then E(v) is a von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if and only if y is the componen-
twise egalitarian allocation rule.
Proof. Take any anonymous, component additive and top convex value function v.
Suppose y is component e¢ cient and anonymous. We will show that E(v) is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if and only if y is the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
())
(1) Suppose E(v) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining and is a singleton set. Then ,either it consists of the complete network
or the empty network because v is anonymous. Since y is anonymous, we have equal
sharing of the value of the e¢ cient network g 2 E(v). Component e¢ ciency, equal
bargaining power and consistency imply that there is equal sharing of the value of
each component among the members of the component for each g0 =2 E(v).18 Hence,
y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
(2) Suppose E(v) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining but is not a singleton set. Top convexity implies that all components
18Equal bargaining power and consistency imply that the allocation rule is either the componen-
twise egalitarian allocation rule or the egalitarian allocation rule. But, the egalitarian allocation
rule violates component e¢ ciency.
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of any g 2 E(v) have the same per-capita value, and that all components of any
g0 such that g0 =2 E(v) have a lower per-capita value than the per-capita value of
any component of any g 2 E(v). Internal stability for E(v) implies that players
share equally the value of any g 2 E(v). Otherwise, since y is component e¢ cient
and anonymous and v is top convex, there would exist some farsighted improving
path from some g 2 E(v) to another g00 2 E(v). Component e¢ ciency, equal
bargaining power and consistency imply that there is equal sharing of the value of
each component among the members of the component for each g0 =2 E(v). Hence,
y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
(() From Lemma 1.
Example 2 Top convexity and farsighted stability with bargaining. Take N =
f1; 2; 3g and the anonymous, component additive, and top convex value function de-
ned by v(f12; 13; 23g) = 6, v(f12; 13g) = v(f12; 23g) = v(f13; 23g) = 7, v(f12g) =
v(f13g) = v(f23g) = 4, and v(;) = 0. We have depicted in Figure 3 the network
congurations with their associated allocations.
First, we show that if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule (i.e. " =
1=3) then E(v) is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining. We have F (;) = G n f;; f12; 13; 23gg; F (f13g) = F (f12g) = F (f23g) =
F (f12; 13; 23g) = ff12; 13g; f12; 23g; f13; 23gg; and F (f12; 13g) = F (f12; 23g) =
F (f13; 23g) = ;. Then, E(v) satises internal stability and external stability. The
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule also satises equal bargaining power and
consistency since there is a z such that zi(g) 2 E(v) for g 2 G and F (g)\E(v) 6= ;
for all g =2 E(v). Hence, E(v) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly sta-
ble set with bargaining. We now show that E(v) is the unique von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Suppose that G is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. We have thatE(v) 
G since F (g) = ; for all g 2 E(v); otherwise, G would violate external stability. In
addition, if E(v)  G then internal stability is violated because F (g)\E(v) 6= ; for
all g =2 E(v). Thus, E(v) = G.
Second, is E(v) a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bar-
gaining if the anonymous and component e¢ cient allocation rule is such that " 6= 1=3
(0 < " < 1=3)? Then, equal bargaining power and consistency can still be satised
as well as external stability but internal stability is violated since now g 2 F (g0),
for any g; g0 2 E(v) (g 6= g0). Hence, once the allocation rule is determined jointly
with the farsighted stability of the network and the value function is anonymous,
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component additive and top convex, the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining only if the sharing of
the value follows the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. 
The next question is whether someG 6= E(v) can be a von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is anonymous and the value function is
anonymous, component additive and top convex.
Example 2 (continued). If y is anonymous then candidate allocations to support
a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining are given in
Figure 3. For " < 0, then ff12; 13; 23gg is the unique set to satisfy internal stability
and external stability. But, the allocations for fij; ikg violate equal bargaining power
because of the consistency requirement. For " = 0, then ffij; ikg; f12; 13; 23gg are
the sets to satisfy internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations
for fij; jkg and fik; jkg violate equal bargaining power because of the consistency
requirement. For 0 < " < 1=3 and 1=3 < "  1=2, then ffij; ikgg are the sets
to satisfy internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations for fijg,
fikg, fij; jkg, fik; jkg, f12; 13; 23g violate equal bargaining power because of the
consistency requirement. For 1=2 < ", then ffijg; f12; 13; 23gg are the sets to satisfy
internal stability and external stability. But, the allocations for fij; jkg, fij; ikg
violate equal bargaining power because of the consistency requirement. For 1=3 =
", the allocation rule reverts to the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule and
E(v) = ff12; 13g; f12; 23g; f13; 23gg is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly
stable set with bargaining. Hence, E(v) is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set with bargaining and the componentwise egalitarian allocation
rule emerges endogenously. 
Proposition 4. Consider any anonymous, component additive and top convex value
function v. If y is component e¢ cient and anonymous then E(v) is the unique von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining.
Proof. See the appendix.
4 Pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining
We now incorporate the property of equal bargaining power for farsighted play-
ers into the original denition of a pairwise farsightedly stable set due to Herings,
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Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009). Formally, pairwise farsighted stability with
bargaining is dened as follows.
Denition 2. A set of networks G  G is pairwise farsightedly stable with bar-
gaining if there exists an allocation rule y and a bargaining threat z such that
(i) 8 g 2 G,
(a) 8 ij =2 g such that g+ij =2 G, 9 g0 2 F (g+ij)\G such that (yi(g0; v); yj(g0,
v)) = (yi(g; v); yj(g; v)) or yi(g0; v) < yi(g; v) or yj(g0; v) < yj(g; v),
(b) 8 ij 2 g such that g  ij =2 G, 9 g0; g00 2 F (g  ij)\G such that yi(g0; v) 
yi(g; v) and yj(g00; v)  yj(g; v),
(ii) 8g0 2 G nG; F (g0) \G 6= ;:
(iii) 8g 2 G and ij 2 g,
(a) yi(g; v)  yi(zi(g); v) = yj(g; v)  yj(zj(g); v),
(b) zi(g) 2 (F (g00)[ fg00g)\G 6= ; for some g00 2 Ai(g) and zj(g) 2 (F (g000)[
fg000g) \G 6= ; for some g000 2 Aj(g).
(iv) @ G0  G such that G0 satises Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii).
Condition (ia) in Denition 2 captures that adding a link ij to a network g 2
G that leads to a network outside of G; is deterred by the threat of ending in
g0: Here g0 is such that there is a farsightedly improving path from g + ij to g0:
Moreover, g0 belongs to G; which makes g0 a credible threat. Condition (ib) is a
similar requirement, but then for the case where a link is severed. Condition (ii)
in Denition 2 requires external stability and implies that the networks within the
set are robust to perturbations. From any network outside G there is a farsightedly
stable path leading to some network in G. Condition (iiia) in Denition 2 is the
equal bargaining power property for farsighted players. Condition (iiib) in Denition
2 imposes a consistency requirement on the bargaining threat. Condition (iv) in
Denition 2 is a minimality condition.
Proposition 5. If G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining, then G is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining.
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Proof. Suppose G is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bar-
gaining. Then, conditions (ii) and (iii) in Denition 2 are trivially satised for G.
Suppose Condition (i) in Denition 2 is not satised. Then there is g 2 G and
a deviation to g0 =2 G such that every g00 2 F (g0) \ G defeats g.19 In particular, it
then follows that g00 2 F (g); a contradiction, since by condition (i) in Denition 1
there is no g00 2 G with that property. Consequently, Condition (i) in Denition 2
holds.
To verify condition (iv) in Denition 2, suppose there is a proper subset G0  G
that satises conditions (i), (ii) and (iii). Let g be in G but not in G0. Then,
F (g) \ G0  F (g) \ G = ; since G satises condition (i) in Denition 1. It follows
that G0  G violates condition (ii) in Denition 2, leading to a contradiction. We
have shown that G is minimal.
From Proposition 5 we have that, in Example 2, E(v) is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set with bargaining where the allocation rule is the componentwise egalitarian
allocation rule.20 However, Proposition 3 does not hold for the pairwise farsighted
stability with bargaining. The set of strongly e¢ cient networks E(v) is a pairwise
farsightedly stable set with bargaining even for anonymous allocation rules where the
value of each component is not shared equally among the members of the component.
Example 2 (continued). If y is anonymous then candidate allocations to support
a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining are given in
Figure 3.
For 0 < "  1=2, the set E(v) = ff12; 13g; f12; 23g; f13; 23gg is a pairwise far-
sightedly stable set with bargaining. External stability is satised. Notice that pair-
wise farsighted stability with bargaining does not require internal stability. Equal
bargaining power for farsighted players and consistency are satised. For instance,
in f12g the bargaining threat z1(f12g) and z2(f12g) can be respectively f12; 13g and
f12; 23g (or simply f13; 23g for both players). Equal bargaining power is satised
since y1(f12g; v)   y1(f12; 13g; v) = 2   3 + 2" = y2(f12g; v)   y2(f12; 23g; v) (or
y1(f12g; v)   y1(f13; 23g; v) = 2   2   " = y2(f12g; v)   y2(f13; 23g; v)) and con-
sistency is satised since z1(f12g); z2(f12g) 2 E(v) and z1(f12g); z2(f12g) 2 F (;).
19A network g0 defeats g if either g0 = g   ij and yi(g0; v) > yi(g; v) or yj(g0; v) > yj(g; v), or
if g0 = g + ij with yi(g0; v)  yi(g; v) and yj(g0; v)  yj(g; v) with at least one inequality holding
strictly.
20Grandjean, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2011) have shown that, if the allocation rule is exoge-
nously given and is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule, then the set of strongly e¢ cient
networks is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set if and only if the value function is top convex.
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E(v) is minimal. Any subset of E(v) would violate equal bargaining power for
" 6= 1=3. Take ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg  E(v). Then, equal bargaining power is vio-
lated at f13; 23g because player 3 obtains an allocation smaller or equal than the
allocations of players 1 and 2 at f12; 13g and f12; 23g. 
However, if all strongly e¢ cient networks are componentwise symmetric, then
Proposition 3 holds for the pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining. A network
g is said to be componentwise symmetric if every player belonging to the same
component has the same number of links. Formally, g is componentwise symmetric
if for each h 2 C(g) we have that #Ni(h) = #Nj(h) for all i; j 2 N(h).
Proposition 6. Consider any anonymous, component additive and top convex value
function v such that E(v) consists only of componentwise symmetric networks. If
y is component e¢ cient and anonymous then E(v) is a pairwise farsightedly stable
set with bargaining if and only if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
Proof. See the appendix.
5 Discussion
5.1 The role of top convexity
We now look at an example where the value function does not satisfy top convexity.
We observe that von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining
is less likely to sustain e¢ cient networks than pairwise farsighted stability with
bargaining.
Example 3 Value function not top convex. Take N = f1; 2; 3g and the anonymous,
component additive, and not top convex value function dened by v(f12; 13; 23g) =
1, v(f12; 13g) = v(f12; 23g) = v(f13; 23g) = 4=3, v(f12g) = v(f13g) = v(f23g) =
1, and v(;) = 0. We have depicted in Figure 4 the network congurations with
anonymous and component e¢ cient allocation rules.
a) 0  " < 1=36. There is no von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable
set with bargaining. The set ff12g; f13g; f23gg is a candidate but it violates in-
ternal stability. In addition, each set ffijgg violates equal bargaining power for
farsighted players at, for instance, networks fikg, fjkg and f12; 13; 23g. But,
ff12g; f13g; f23gg is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining only if " = 0.
It can be easily veried that all conditions are satised. It is minimal since any
20
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Figure 4: Value function not top convex and farsighted stability with bargaining.
nonempty subset G  ff12g; f13g; f23gg would satisfy all conditions except that
equal bargaining power would be violated at g 2 ff12g; f13g; f23gg nG.
b) 1=36  " < 1=9. The sets ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg, ff12; 13g; f13; 23gg and
ff12; 23g; f13; 23gg are pairwise farsightedly stable sets with bargaining. Exter-
nal stability, equal bargaining power, consistency and minimality are satised. But,
they are not von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets with bargaining
because internal stability is violated.
c) 1=9  " < 4=9. There is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set
with bargaining only if " = 1=6. If " = 1=6, thenG0 = ff12g; f13g; f23g; f12; 13; 23gg
is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining. This set
G0 satises internal and external stability, equal bargaining power and consistency.
Equal bargaining power requires that at f12; 13g we have y1(f12g; v) y1(f12; 13g; v) =
y3(f12g; v) y3(f12; 13g; v). Since y1(f12g; v) y1(f12; 13g; v) = 1=2 4=9 2" and
y3(f12g; v)   y3(f12; 13g; v) = 0   4=9 + ", equal bargaining power holds only if
" = 1=6. Obviously, G0 with " = 1=6 is also a pairwise farsightedly stable set with
bargaining. However, G0 is not the unique one. The set E(v) [ f12; 13; 23g is a
pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining for 1=36  " < 4=9.
Hence, contrary to pairwise farsighted stability with bargaining, von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsighted stability with bargaining only leads to the emergence of
ine¢ cient networks. 
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5.2 The role of equal bargaining power
We now reconsider Example 2 to show that if the allocation rule y does not satisfy
anonymity and/or equal bargaining power, then the componentwise egalitarian al-
location does not emerge in the long run. Given a vector w = (w1; :::; wn)  0, an
allocation rule y satises w-weighted bargaining power21 for farsighted players if for
all v 2 V, for all g 2 G, for all ij 2 g,
1
wi
[yi(g; v)  yi(zi(g); v)] = 1
wj
[yj(g; v)  yj(zj(g); v)] . (iiia0)
Consider the denition of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stability with bar-
gaining where the equal bargaining power condition (iiia) is replaced by the w-
weighted bargaining power condition (iiia0). Suppose that (w1; w2; w3) is such that
1 = w2 = w3  w1 = . For  > 1 the set E(v) is still a von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set with bargaining where players share equally the value for each
network g 2 E(v) while they share unequally the value for each nonempty network
g =2 E(v) (the allocations for  = 2 are given in Table 3). Since each player ob-
tains the same allocation in each e¢ cient star network, the property of weighted
bargaining power forces the players to agree on asymmetric allocations at symmet-
ric networks. It can be easily veried that internal stability, external stability and
consistency are satised too.
; f12g f13g f23g f12; 13g f12; 23g f13; 23g f12; 13; 23g
y1 0 17=9 17=9 0 7=3 7=3 7=3 22=12
y2 0 19=9 0 2 7=3 7=3 7=3 25=12
y3 0 0 19=9 2 7=3 7=3 7=3 25=12
Table 3: Allocations satisfying w-weighted bargaining power for  = 2
Hence, the property of equal bargaining power for farsighted players is a tight condi-
tion for having the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule arising endogenously.
5.3 The role of divergent bargaining threats
The denitions of von Neumann-Morgenstern and pairwise farsighted stability with
bargaining require that bargaining threats are credible but allow players to hold
divergent credible bargaining threats. That is, two players who are bargaining over
21Such an allocation rule is called w-fairness in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997).
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how to share the benets of being linked may disagree about the network that would
be formed in case they do not reach an agreement.
We now reconsider Example 3 to illustrate the role of allowing players to hold
divergent credible threats. Let " = 1=36. Then ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg is a pairwise
farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Suppose now that players hold common
bargaining threats if possible. Hence, when the players bargain at the complete
network f12; 13; 23g they hold either f12; 13g or f12; 23g as common credible threat.
Take f12; 13g as common credible threat at f12; 13; 23g. If v and y are anonymous,
then " cannot be equal to 1=36; otherwise, players would have to share unequally
the value at the complete network.
Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that requiring common bargaining threats
if possible would make more likely the emergence of allocation rules that are not
anonymous. For instance, ff12; 13g; f12; 23gg is not a pairwise farsightedly stable
set when the allocations are those given in Figure 4 for " = 1=36, but it is a pairwise
farsightedly stable set with bargaining for the allocations given in Table 4.
f12; 13g
; f12g f13g f23g f13; 23g f12; 23g f12; 13; 23g
y1 0 13=24 13=24 0 15=36 18=36 14=36
y2 0 11=24 0 11=24 15=36 15=36 11=36
y3 0 0 11=24 13=24 18=36 15=36 11=36
Table 4: A non-anonymous farsighted allocation rule for Example 3
5.4 The role of component additivity
Component additivity (or no externalities across components) means that the value
of a component of the network does not depend on the structure of the network
outside the component. We now look at situations where externalities across com-
ponents can arise and we provide an alternative condition to top convexity such
that the set of e¢ cient networks remains the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern far-
sightedly stable set with bargaining. A value function v is link monotonic (Navarro,
2013b) if for any S 2 (g) and any ij 2 gjS we have
(i) v(S; g) > v(S 0; g ij)+v(S 00; g ij) if S 0 2 (g ij) with i 2 S 0, S 00 2 (g ij)
with j 2 S 00, and S 0 \ S 00 = ;;
(ii) v(S; g) > v(S; g   ij) if S 2 (g   ij).
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A value function v satises strong critical-link monotonicity (Navarro, 2013b) if v is
link monotonic and if for any g, any S 2 (g) and any ij 2 gjS such that #(g) =
#(g   ij)   1 we have v(S; g)=#S > maxfv(S 0; g   ij)=#S 0; v(S 00; g   ij)=#S 00g
where S 0 2 (g   ij) with i 2 S 0 and S 00 2 (g   ij) with j 2 S 00. The link ij is
said to be critical. That is, if it is severed, then the component that it was a part of
will become two components (or one of the nodes will become disconnected). Strong
critical-link monotonicity imposes that if we add a link to the network such that
two components become connected then the per-capita value of the new component
is greater than the per-capita value of any of the two component before adding the
link.
Proposition 7. Consider any value function that satises anonymity and strong
critical-link monotonicity. Suppose that y is component e¢ cient and anonymous.
The set fgNg is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining if and only if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
Proof. See the appendix.
Thus, if the value function satises anonymity and strong critical-link monotonic-
ity and the allocation rule satises component e¢ cient and anonymous, then the
strongly e¢ cient network is likely to emerge in the long run together with the compo-
nentwise egalitarian allocation rule when players are farsighted. In addition, Navarro
(2013b) has shown that there exists a forward-looking network formation process
consisting of an allocation rule and a transition probability matrix such that the al-
location rule is component e¢ cient and the complete network is the only absorbing
state of the transition probability matrix for any strictly positive common discount
factor.
6 Conclusion
We have studied the stability of social and economic networks when farsighted
players simultaneously form links and bargain over allocations. In particular, we
have shown that the set of strongly e¢ cient networks is the unique von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if the allocation rule is anony-
mous and component e¢ cient and the value function is top convex. In addition, the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule emerges endogenously.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Take any path fi1; i2; :::; ik; ik+1; :::; ilg in g between player i and player j with
i1 = i and il = j. Applying the equal bargaining power property for farsighted
players, we have that
yi1(g; v) = yi1(zi1(g); v)  yi2(zi2(g); v) + yi2(g; v)
= i1i2(zi1(g); zi2(g); v) + yi2(g; v),
where i1i2(zi1(g); zi2(g); v) is the di¤erence between player i1s allocation at her
bargaining threat and player i2s allocation at his bargaining threat. Applying the
equal bargaining power property for farsighted players, we have also that
yi2(g; v) = yi2(zi2(g); v)  yi3(zi3(g); v) + yi3(g; v)
= i2i3(zi2(g); zi3(g); v) + yi3(g; v).
Hence,
yi1(g; v) = i1i2(zi1(g); zi2(g); v) + i2i3(zi2(g); zi3(g); v) + yi3(g; v).
Notice that ikik+1(zik(g); zik+1(g); v) =  ik+1ik(zik+1(g); zik(g); v). Iterating this
reasoning, we obtain
yi1(g; v) =
k=l 1X
k=1
ikik+1(zik(g); zik+1(g); v) + yil(g; v)
= yi1(zi1(g); v)  yil(zil(g); v) + yil(g; v).
Hence,
yi(g; v) = yi(zi(g); v)  yj(zj(g); v) + yj(g; v).
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Summing up for all j 2 S (j 6= i) such that S 2 (g) and i 2 S, we have
(#S   1) yi(g; v) = (#S   1) yi(zi(g); v) +
X
j2S2(g);j 6=i
(yj(g; v)  yj(zj(g); v)) .
Since y satises the component e¢ ciency property, i.e.
P
j2S2(g) yj(g; v) = v(S; g),
we have that
(#S) yi(g; v) = (#S   1) yi(zi(g); v) + v(S; g) 
X
j2S2(g);j 6=i
yj(zj(g); v).
Hence,
yi(g; v) = yi(zi(g); v) +
1
#S
0@v(S; g)  X
j2S2(g)
yj(zj(g); v)
1A .

Proof of Proposition 4.
Suppose that y is anonymous and component e¢ cient and v is anonymous, com-
ponent additive and top convex. We will show that there is no von Neumann-
Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining G 6= E(v).
(i) Take any G such that G \ E(v) = ; and G is von Neumann-Morgenstern far-
sightedly stable set with bargaining.
(ia) Suppose that G = fgg. Anonymity of v and y imply equal sharing of the
value of the complete network. Hence, if g is the complete network, then equal
bargaining power and consistency imply that, in any g0 6= g, members of each
component share equally the value of each component. If g is not the complete
network, then equal bargaining power and consistency imply that members of each
component of g share equally the value of the component. Then, top convexity of
the value function implies that g =2 F (g00) for all g00 2 E(v) (any g00 2 E(v) Pareto
dominates all g0 =2 E(v)). Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability and we have a
contradiction.
(ib) Suppose that #G > 1. Internal stability for G implies that players obtain
the same allocation in any g 2 G. Then, equal bargaining power and consistency
imply that, in any g0 =2 G, members of each component share equally the value
of each component. Furthermore, top convexity of the value function implies that
g =2 F (g00) for all g00 2 E(v) and g 2 G. Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability
and we have a contradiction.
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(ii) Take G such that G\E(v) 6= ;, G 6= E(v) and G is von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set with bargaining.
(iia) Suppose that G = fgg. Notice that g is a strongly e¢ cient network,
g 2 E(v). Anonymity of v and y imply equal sharing of the value of the complete
network. Hence, if g is the complete network, then equal bargaining power and
consistency imply that, in any g0 6= g, members of each component share equally the
value of each component. If g is not the complete network, then equal bargaining
power and consistency imply that members of each component of g share equally the
value of the component. Top convexity implies that all components of a strongly
e¢ cient network must lead to the same per-capita value (if some component led
to a lower per capita value than the average, then another component would have
to lead to a higher per capita value than the average which would contradict top
convexity). Then, since G = fgg  E(v), there is g00 2 E(v), g00 6= g, such that
g =2 F (g00). Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability and we have a contradiction.
(iib) Suppose that#G > 1. First, consider the case G ! E(v). Internal stability
for G implies that players obtain the same allocation in any g; g0 2 G, but this is
not possible since by top convexity g 2 G \ E(v) Pareto dominates g0 2 G n E(v).
Hence, G fails to satisfy internal stability and we have a contradiction. Second,
consider the case G  E(v). Internal stability for G implies that players obtain
the same allocation in any g 2 G, and is satised since v is top convex. Then,
equal bargaining power and consistency imply that, in any g0 =2 G, members of each
component share equally the value of each component. But there is g0 =2 G such that
g0 2 E(v). Top convexity of the value function implies that there is no g 2 G such
that g 2 F (g0) for any g0 =2 G, g0 2 E(v). Hence, G fails to satisfy external stability
and we have a contradiction. Third, consider the case G + E(v) and G * E(v).
Similar arguments lead to a contradiction.
Thus, if y is anonymous and component e¢ cient and v is anonymous, compo-
nent additive and top convex, then E(v) is the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern
farsightedly stable set with bargaining and the endogenously determined allocation
rule is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. 
Proof of Proposition 6.
Take any anonymous, component additive and top convex value function v such
that E(v) consists only of componentwise symmetric networks. Suppose y is com-
ponent e¢ cient and anonymous. We will show that E(v) is a pairwise farsightedly
stable set with bargaining if and only if y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation
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rule.
())
Suppose E(v) is a pairwise farsightedly stable set with bargaining. Since y is
anonymous and component e¢ cient and E(v) consists only of componentwise sym-
metric networks, there is equal sharing of the value of each component among the
members of the component for each g 2 E(v). Top convexity implies that all com-
ponents of any g 2 E(v) have the same per-capita value, and that all components of
any g0 such that g0 =2 E(v) have a lower per-capita value than the per-capita value of
any component of any g 2 E(v). Component e¢ ciency, equal bargaining power and
consistency imply that there is equal sharing of the value of each component among
the members of the component for each g0 =2 E(v). Hence, y is the componentwise
egalitarian allocation rule.
(() From Proposition 1 in Grandjean, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2011). 
Proof of Proposition 7.
Take any value function v that satises anonymity and strong critical-link monotonic-
ity. Navarro (2013b) has shown that if v satises strong critical-link monotonicity,
then the complete network gN is the unique strongly e¢ cient network. Suppose y
is component e¢ cient and anonymous. We will show that E(v) = fgNg is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if and only if y is the
componentwise egalitarian allocation rule.
())
SupposeE(v) = fgNg is a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with
bargaining. Since y is anonymous and component e¢ cient and E(v) consists only
of the complete network, there is equal sharing of the value of the complete network
among all players. Component e¢ ciency, equal bargaining power and consistency
imply that there is equal sharing of the value of each component among the members
of the component for each g0 =2 E(v). Hence, y is the componentwise egalitarian
allocation rule.
(()
Take any anonymous and strong critical-link monotonic value function v. Sup-
pose that y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule. Since E(v) = fgNg it
follows that v(gN)=#N > v(g)=#N for any g 6= gN such that (g) = fNg. Strong
critical-link monotonicity implies that under the componentwise egalitarian alloca-
tion rule the strongly e¢ cient network gN Pareto dominates all g0 6= gN . Then, it is
immediate that F (g) = ; for gN [Internal stability] and that F (g0)\fgNg 6= ; for all
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g0 6= gN [External stability]. Since y is the componentwise egalitarian allocation rule,
equal bargaining power for farsighted players is satised for z such that zi(g) = gN
[Equal bargaining power]. In addition, z such that zi(g) = gN is consistent since
(F (g0)[fg0g)\fgNg 6= ; for all g0 6= gN [Consistency]. Thus, fgNg satises internal
stability, external stability, equal bargaining power and consistency. It is the unique
von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set with bargaining if y is the com-
ponentwise egalitarian allocation rule because F (gN) = ; and F (g0) \ fgNg 6= ; for
all g0 6= gN . 
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